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CONTENTS
• Taxes on short-term capital flows such as introduced in Chile and Slovenia during the 1990s in the form of
unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs) on financial credits are under discussion as a remedy against
adverse effects of volatile international capital flows. From a theoretical point of view, URRs find support
from the fact that financial markets react faster to exogenous shocks than goods markets. A high volatility of
capital flows, in turn, may reduce investment and exports, and thus negatively affect overall growth. A tax
designed to reduce inflows of (short-term) capital and to enhance the autonomy of domestic monetary
policy may therefore raise welfare.
• Yet, the effectiveness of URRs is limited because capital controls can at best delay but not prevent specu-
lative attacks on misaligned currencies. Moreover, a temporary introduction of capital controls, as is often
proposed in the case of an acute financial crisis, may have the adverse effect of increasing rather than
lowering financial market volatility.
• The empirical evidence from Chile and Slovenia shows that URRs are no panacea and that the gain in
monetary autonomy has been limited. While the composition of inflows has changed towards flows
exempted from the URR, the overall inflow of capital has increased, and interest rate effects have been
short-lived. There is no evidence that the volatility of capital flows has declined. Exchange rate volatility
seems to have come down, albeit possibly as a result of exchange market intervention.
• Capital controls are often proposed as a tool to promote the stability of the financial sector. More specifi-
cally, it is often argued that external financial liberalization should proceed only after sufficient progress has
been made in reforming the domestic banking system. Yet, the administrative capacity to enforce capital
controls is typically weak precisely in those countries which have poorly supervised and thus potentially
unstable banking systems. Also, foreign competition can enhance the efficiency of the domestic financial
sector. Thus, progressing simultaneously on internal and external financial liberalization seems the
preferable option. At the time of opening up for foreign capital, minimum prudential standards should be in
place. Also, public deposit guarantees should have been abolished in order to limit the risk of overborrowing
and moral hazard.
• The imposition of capital controls may even send negative signals to investors and thus affect investment
negatively. Exposure to external shocks should rather be reduced by pursuing structural reforms, by follow-
ing sound macroeconomic policies, by disseminating clear and transparent information, and by using
market mechanisms to alter the structure of foreign debt. This also allows for a more efficient use of scarce
administrative resources. In this context, international institutions have an important role to play in designing
and enforcing an institutional framework in which such mechanisms can be implemented.
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The severe financial and economic crises which
have beleaguered Asia, Russia, and Brazil re-
cently and which" have sent their shock waves
not only through other emerging markets have
left policymakers around the globe looking for
possible remedies. Facing distortions such as
asymmetries in information and price rigidities,
the goal is to shield basically innocent bystand-
ers from the adverse effects of external finan-
cial shocks and to provide countries with
breathing space to correct policy mistakes.
Taxes on short-term capital flows such as pro-
posed in 1978 by James Tobin and as intro-
duced in Chile in 1991 have entered policy dis-
cussions prominently. In his original proposal,
Tobin (1978: 154f.) advocated throwing "some
sand in the wheels of excessively efficient inter-
national money markets" by means of an "inter-
nationally uniform tax on all spot conversions
of one currency into another."
A pure Tobin tax would cover all foreign ex-
change transactions and all traders. It would be
collected by the national tax authorities at a low
tax rate which is invariant to interest rates. Im-
plementation must be world-wide, and the main
intentions of the tax are to reduce financial mar-
ket volatility and to expand the autonomy of
national monetary policy. Yet, the implementa-
tion of such an instrument raises several issues,
notably the coordination of national tax policies
and the efficient use of the proceeds of the tax.
1
Recent policy discussions have focused on
unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs) of
the type implemented in Chile since the early
1990s. Less attention than to Chile is usually
paid to the case of Slovenia although the coun-
try has had a similar regime since 1995. URRs
and other capital account restrictions which
more
% than proportionally raise the costs of
short-term capital are the focus of this paper:
being expressed as constant percentage of the
size of the financial flows, the tax rate per unit
of time is larger for a short-term financial credit
than for a loan with a longer maturity. Note,
however, that although URRs come closest to
the original proposal of Tobin, URRs of the
Slovene or Chilean type do not qualify as pure
Tobin taxes. This is because they are not levied
on all capital account items and because they
are not imposed multilaterally.
Among the proponents of Chilean-type capi-
tal controls on inflows of foreign capital are
a host of well-known economists and interna-
tional institutions (cf. Eichengreen 1999; World
Bank 1998).
2 A recent survey of financial liber-
alization episodes concluded that delaying and
possibly limiting capital account convertibility
might be a sensible strategy to deal with the
risks of financial integration (Williamson and
Mahar 1998: 65). On a policy level, various
countries such as Malaysia, Russia, or Brazil
have resorted to restrictions on the free flow of
capital recently although most of these controls
go substantially beyond the proposals from aca-
demia. These observations suggest that " [...],
the abrupt reversals in economies that were
hitherto deemed miraculous have challenged
the conventional wisdom that it is a good thing
to let capital move freely across borders."
3
During the past two decades, various other
variants of the Tobin tax have also been dis-
cussed. Eichengreen et al. (1995: 166), for ex-
ample, proposed a tax or deposit requirement on
all domestic-currency lending to nonresidents.
Their proposal originally aimed at preventing
speculation against EU currencies prior to the
introduction of the euro and, more generally,
to protect the domestic balance of payments.
Garber and Taylor (1995) discussed zero-inter-
est margin deposits or prudential bank capital
requirements against net foreign exchange posi-
tions as options to limit the amount of foreign
borrowing of commercial banks. Both restric-
tions would raise the effective costs of foreign
loans and thus make borrowing from abroad
less attractive. However, it can be shown that
such regulations may have the perverse effect
For a discussion see also Frankel (1996).
For an overview, see the homepage of Nouriel
Roubini via the homepage of the NYU Econom-
ics Department (http://www.stern.nyu.edu/Faculty/
FacPict/Economics/index.htm).
The Economist (1/98) "Keeping the hot money out",
downloaded from Roubini's homepage on Asia on
April 21, 1999.of speeding up the collapse of a fixed exchange
rate regime rather than enhancing its sustain-
ability precisely because they lower foreign
borrowing (Buch and Heinrich 1999).
As the recent discussion has focused on
Chilean-type capital controls, this paper will
summarize the discussion to date and discuss
whether URRs are an optimal response to in-
creased financial risks. We start by giving a
brief overview of global financial flows and
capital account restrictions with a special focus
on the experiences of Chile and Slovenia which
have implemented Tobin-type capital controls
(Chapter 2). Facing potentially adverse effects
of foreign capital flows, policymakers essential-
ly have two options. First, they can resort to
measures that directly aim at reducing the
volume and the volatility of capital flows by
levying taxes on cross-border capital flows. The
usefulness and effectiveness of such measures
will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this paper.
Second, policymakers can try to affect the
structure of capital flows by an adjustment of
domestic policies and by reforms of the inter-
national financial architecture.
4 The scope and
the limitations of such approaches will be ana-
lyzed in Chapter 4. This chapter will particular-
ly draw on the experiences of other transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe in
dealing with the contagion effects of the
Russian financial crisis in order to show the
scope of domestic policy to shield a country
from adverse external developments.
2.1 Short-Term Capital Flows
Standard balance of payments statistics do give
only insufficient account of the share of short-
term capital flows in total international finance.
Inflows of financial credits are often not classi-
fied according to their maturity, and portfolio
capital flows are likewise not broken down by
maturity. Data provided by the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) on the maturity
structure of bank lending towards countries out-
side the BIS-reporting area can be used as an
indicator, though (Figure 1). These data show
that the share of short-term loans in total lend-
ing has shifted upward when comparing the
1990s to the 1980s. While in the 1980s roughly
40 percent of all foreign loans had a maturity
of less than one year, this share increased to
more than 50 percent in the 1990s. Recently, it
has come down again. Interestingly, trends in
developing countries have relatively closely
tracked those in developed countries although
the level of short-term loans has been somewhat
higher for the group of developing countries in
the 1990s.
Overall, Mussa et al. (1999) noted that there
seemed not to have been a secular trend towards
an increasing share of short-term foreign debt in
recent decades. Yet, they confirmed the evi-
dence presented in Figure 1: Remaining matu-
rities tended to shorten during the boom phase
of large capital flows between the late 1980s
and mid-1990s while they lengthened after-
wards.
2. Capital Flows and Capital
Controls
There is a common perception that capital flows
have become more volatile in recent years and
that a rise in short-term capital flows has pro-
moted these developments. This chapter gives a
brief account of the statistical evidence on the
structure of capital flows, and it reviews the
policies that countries have implemented to
shield themselves from volatile capital flows.
2.2 Capital Account Restrictions
Despite the on-going liberalization of capital
account transactions that has taken place over
the past two decades, almost two-thirds of the
countries surveyed regularly by the Internation-
al Monetary Fund (IMF) had some restrictions
on commercial or financial credits in place in
1998. At the same time, the share of countries
imposing restrictions on capital account trans-
actions seems to have fallen: in 1990, almost 80
percent of all countries surveyed had restricted
For a recent contribution, see Eichengreen (1999).Figure 1: Short-Term Loans











aLoans with a maturity of less than one year.
Source: BIS (1999b).
at least some capital account items, in 1998, it
was merely two thirds of them (Table 1).
The motivations of countries to impose capi-
tal controls and the forms of controls that are
actually being chosen have been the subject of
various survey papers. In a recent study,
Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) found that con-
trols on capital outflows were more prevalent
than controls on capital inflows. To improve
balance of payment management, to address
prudential considerations, and to overcome
weaknesses in the state of development of the





Table 1: Capital Account Restrictions,
Number of countries included
Share of countries with restrictions
on capital account transactions (%)
Share of countries with restrictions
on commercial credits (%)
Share of countries with restrictions
















The empirical literature tends to provide rela-
tively little evidence to support the effective-
ness of capital controls, particularly of controls
on capital outflows. Dooley (1996) found that
capital controls have been successful in driving
a small gap between domestic and foreign inter-
est rates but do not seem to have had the im-
pact on economic welfare that economic theory
might predict. Similar conclusions were reached
by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) who found
capital controls to be correlated with higher in-
flation and lower real interest rates but not with
economic growth.
2.3 Taxes on Short-Term Capital
Flows: The Cases of Chile and
Slovenia
Since the focus of this paper is on the effects
and the effectiveness of Tobin-type taxes on
short-term capital flows, it is useful to review
the experiences of Chile and Slovenia which
Source: IMF (1998b).have implemented unremunerated reserve re-
quirements (URRs).
Since 1991, foreign loans and deposits by
nonresidents in Chile have generally been sub-
ject to a 20 % URR.
5 Instead of holding the
reserves, the Bank of Chile has also offered in-
vestors to pay an up-front fee in an amount
equivalent to the reserve requirement. The re-
serve rate was raised to 30 % in May 1992, and
the deposit period was then fixed to one year.
Also, a 1.2 percent stamp tax on local currency
credits was at that time extended to all foreign
loans, excluding trade credits. Although the ex-
emption of this item has certainly created loop-
holes and has therefore reduced the effective-
ness of the tax, Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1998)
have argued that it would have been difficult
politically to extend the coverage of the tax also
to the export sector.
Valdes-Prieto and Soto have also calculated
the tax equivalent (i) of the Chilean URR. As-
sume that an amount L invested in the inter-
national capital market yields the foreign inter-
bank rate i* plus an intermediation spread s.
Then, the interest revenue foregone, when
lending to an economy that imposes an URR,
amounts to (/ * +s)rL, where r = reserve require-
ment. This needs to be related to the total
amount of funds lent, (1 - r)L . Combining these
terms, the tax equivalent of the reserve require-




Hence, the effective tax rate increases in the
foreign interest rate, in the intermediation spread,
and in the reserve requirement. Moreover, the
tax rate is lower (ceteris paribus), the longer the
maturity of the loan. As the tax rate depends
inter alia on the foreign interest rate, it is thus
not fully controllable by the authorities (unless
r is being adjusted continuously). Because only
inflows of foreign capital are subject to the re-
serve requirement, the tax rate is zero for capi-
This and the following information have been taken
from Laban and Larrain (1998), Ffrench-Davis et al.
(1995), and IMF (1998b). Chile's experience with
capital controls in the 1980s is briefly reviewed in
Edwards (1999).
tal outflows, i.e., for loans granted abroad by
Chilean residents. After rising gradually from
zero to about 4 % between 1991 and mid-1992,
the rate further increased to roughly 6 % in
1995 (Figure 2). In autumn 1998, the URR was
set to zero, showing the intention of the author-
ities to flexibly adjust it to the cycle of inter-
national capital flows (Eichengreen 1999: 53).
At least in the beginning, the Chilean URR
was considered as being relatively successful,
and Laban et al. (1997: 21) concluded that "the
case for the ineffectiveness of capital controls
may have been overstated". Yet, because mar-
kets found ways to circumvent the reserve re-
quirements by shifting activities into unregu-
lated areas, the Chilean authorities successively
had to expand the coverage of the controls
(Laban and Larrain 1998). In 1995, the deposit
requirement was extended to other financial in-
vestments, excluding foreign direct investment
(FDI) and first issues of American Depository
Receipts (ADRs). Since 1996, reserve require-
ments have also covered credits after their first
rollover. Moreover, the maximum proportion of
foreign investment projects that could be fi-
nanced through debt was lowered from 70 to 50
percent, and the minimum amount of foreign
direct investment exempted from the reserve
requirement was raised. These adjustments be-
came necessary because trades migrated to less
regulated markets.
In addition, Chile's currency has come under
pressure in the wake of the Asian crises to
which Chile is heavily exposed due to its large
exports to that region. In response, the govern-
ment successively reduced the deposit require-
ment from 30 to zero percent in September
1998 (Laurens and Cardoso 1998: 10). The
intention was to attract more capital in order to
support the currency and to prevent a further
devaluation which would hurt firms with open
foreign exchange liabilities (Banco Central de
Chile 1998). Thus, precisely at a time when
currency turmoil elsewhere would suggest that
a Tobin-type tax might prove particularly use-
ful, the Chilean authorities apparently con-
cluded that, whatever the benefits of the tax,
they could no longer afford to turn away for-











Source: Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1998).
1993 1994 1995 1996
taken into account when assessing whether
Chile has been affected by the Asian financial
crises.
Similar to Chile in the 1990s, Slovenia has
introduced an URR on financial credits and has
lowered the reserve rate to zero recently. In
February 1995, the Bank of Slovenia (BoS)
introduced a number of restrictions for regu-
lating capital flows, among which a non-inter-
est-bearing deposit in Slovene tolars for finan-
cial credits featured prominently: 40 percent of
each financial credit from abroad had to be put
in a non-interest-bearing account at the BoS for
the period of two years if the financial credit
had a maturity of less than seven years. For
longer maturities, the deposit requirement was
only 10 percent. Clearly, the Slovene capital
control regime "punishes" short-term capital
flows more severely than long-term flows,
when one takes the annualized foregone interest
rate into account. In January 1999, the BoS set
the reserve requirement to zero, signaling that
more foreign credits would be desired.
6 This
move has followed a sharp drop in net capital
inflows in 1998 (Buch and Hanschel 1999). As
the system has not been abandoned entirely, the
BoS in principle has retained the option to raise
the reserve rate on short notice again.
3. Effectiveness of Capital
Controls
In a world without frictions and with perfectly
competitive markets, there would be no scope
for controls on the free flow of capital: differ-
ences in the rates of return on capital between
two countries would trigger capital flows, rates
of return would converge, and overall welfare
would increase. Yet, as soon as more realistic
features of markets such as asymmetric infor-
mation and less-than-instantaneous adjustment
processes are taken into account, the free flow
of capital does not necessarily serve to achieve
optimal welfare. Rather, a second-best equilib-
rium which features some form of capital con-
trols may be the optimal solution.
The following chapter will look at the ex-
periences of Chile and Slovenia with the re-
serve requirements more closely. It will be ar-
gued that the success of the regimes needs to be
measured against the gain in monetary auton-
omy, the reduction in financial market vola-
tility, and the impact on investment that is
achieved.
7 Throughout the discussion, an im-
See BoS (1999).
We thus abstract from other motivations to have
capital controls, such as the maintenance of the
domestic tax base and the retention of domestic
savings. See Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) for an
overview.portant caveat must be borne in mind: By
focusing on the possible links between URRs
and macroeconomic developments, influences
of other important policy measures are often
left out of account. This is a main reason why
Nadal-De Simone and Sorsa (1999: 49) argued
that "It seems premature to point out the
Chilean experience as supportive of the effec-
tiveness of controls on capital inflows [...]."
8
The Chilean authorities have, for instance,
made substantial headway with regard to en-
hancing the stability of their banking system.
Moreover, the choice of an exchange rate re-
gime has implications for the structure of capi-
tal flows. In particular, pegged exchange rates
tend to signal the belief to market participants
that exchange rates will remain stable, thus en-
couraging borrowing from abroad.
3.1 Capital Controls and Monetary
Autonomy
A main reason why capital controls are recom-
mended and introduced, is their potential of af-
fording the monetary authorities with greater
autonomy. In the case of floating exchange
rates, capital controls may help policymakers to
dissolve the conflict between setting domestic
interest rates and the resulting exchange rate
(and thus trade) effects. In the case of fixed ex-
change rates, capital controls may give policy-
makers some autonomy over domestic interest
rates without triggering capital inflows that may
sacrifice a monetary target. Regardless of the
exchange rate regime, monetary autonomy is
thus the greater, the more effective capital con-
trols are in influencing the level of capital in-
flows. In addition, the volatility of capital
flows, which will be discussed below, has an
impact on the degree of freedom of the mone-
tary authorities, as a high volatility eventually
requires frequent policy actions.
Whether capital controls are actually effec-
tive in achieving these goals, remains an em-
pirical issue. Effectiveness depends, first, on the
relevance of the controls. In Chile, the reserve
requirement was relevant in the sense that it
yielded substantial tax revenue (Valdes-Prieto
and Soto 1998). This is in contrast to the ex-
periences of other, developing countries for
which the evasion of capital account restrictions
has been pervasive and which have raised little
revenue from taxes on cross-border capital
flows (Dooley 1996).
The second criterion is whether the controls
have a dampening impact on overall inflows of
capital. For Chile, this has not been the case
(Laurens and Cardoso 1998: 12). While the
composition of inflows has changed in favor of
those flows exempted from the tax, the overall
inflow of capital, and thus Chile's external debt,
has, if anything, increased (Figure 3a).
9 This is
a result of the strong fundamentals of the Chilean
economy as well as of external factors which
have increased the availability of financial funds.
This is also reflected in a general increase in the
foreign debt stocks of the Latin American coun-
tries, although Chilean foreign debt has been
accumulating at a somewhat slower pace than the
debt in the other two countries.
In relation to GDP, Chile's external debt has
decreased in recent years (Figure 3b). This is in
contrast to developments in Argentina or
Mexico, where foreign debt has increased also
in relative terms lately. Still, the decline in
Chile is difficult to attribute to the imposition of
the capital controls alone as it has started al-
ready in the mid-1980s and as a similar time
pattern could be observed for a country like
Brazil. Edwards (1998b) likewise gave evi-
dence for an increase in capital inflows, and he
found a change in the structure of capital flows
towards longer-term instruments after the im-
position of the URRs. Moreover, he showed the
impact of the controls on the real exchange rate
and on interest rate differentials to be limited
and short-lived although some short-run in-
fluences were visible.
o
° For a similar assessment, see Edwards (1999).
A theoretical argument explaining the increase in
capital inflows after the imposition of URRs was
provided by Cordelia (1998). He argued that URRs
served as a buffer against liquidity shocks. Hence,
risk-averse agents which faced uncertainty about their
liquidity needs would be more willing to provide
funding in the presence of the URR. Note that this
argument is essentially the same as for minimum
reserve requirements in a domestic setting.Figure 3: External Debt of Selected Latin American Countries, 1975-1996
a) Billions of current US dollars
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The evidence for Slovenia roughly supports
the findings for Chile. Capital flows have in-
creased in absolute terms after the imposition of
the reserve requirement, and this has also trans-
mitted into an increase of debt relative to GDP
(World Bank 1999). Developments have been
roughly in line with those in the Czech Repub-
lic or Estonia. Foreign debt of Hungary and
Poland, in contrast, has declined in recent years,
primarily as a result of the restructuring and re-
payment of old debt. For Slovenia, there is
hardly any evidence for an impact of the con-
trols on the overall composition of capital flows
(Buch and Hanschel 1999). More specifically,10
Slovenia has not received relatively more long-
term capital inflows in the form of FDI or less
financial credits than other comparable tran-
sition economies. In fact, as the BoS has been
following an implicit exchange rate target, it
has accumulated substantial foreign reserves
and has in this sense failed to gain monetary
autonomy.
Moreover, while (Chilean-type) capital con-
trols may enhance monetary autonomy in tran-
quil periods, they are unable to prevent specula-
tive attacks on overvalued currencies in general.
Traditional speculative attack models indicate
that inconsistencies between macroeconomic
policies are at the heart of financial crises.
1
0 A
speculative attack on the foreign exchange re-
serves of a central bank occurs if the (shadow)
floating exchange rate, which is determined by
market fundamentals, equals the fixed exchange
rate, which the central bank tries to defend by
selling its reserves. In such models, the proba-
bility of a speculative attack increases with the
rate of monetary expansion. This, in turn, de-
pends on the amount of deficit financing pro-
vided by the monetary authorities, on the inter-
est sensitivity of money demand, and on the
volume of foreign reserves of the central bank.
As the Asian financial crises have shown,
fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances are not
necessarily the sole causes of financial crises.
Rather, institutional weaknesses, in particular in
the banking sectors, have been identified as im-
portant causes of currency crises. Models that
feature such microeconomic weaknesses have
been labeled "third generation" speculative at-
tack models, following the second generation
models which have focused on self-fulfilling
attacks (Obstfeld 1994).
Regardless of the crisis being caused by
micro- or macroeconomic distortions, the issue
has been raised that taxes on cross-border capi-
tal flows "buy time" for domestic policymakers
to adjust to adverse external shocks. Essential-
ly, this argument was supported by the analysis
of Park and Sachs (1996) who showed that
capital controls can delay the breakdown of a
fixed exchange rate system. In contrast to the
present paper, the authors assumed fairly re-
strictive capital controls on both capital in- and
outflows which fully prevent households from
changing their foreign bond holdings. These
controls thus shift the entire adjustment process
to the current account. Yet, while the collapse
of a fixed exchange rate can be postponed in
this model, it cannot be prevented. Moreover,
balance of payments crises are delayed only at
the cost of lower consumption and of a greater
jump in the exchange rate at the time of
the collapse, if compared to a regime without
capital controls. Hence, the time that policy-
makers can buy might be relatively short, and it
will depend on how credible the public deems
the adjustment to be. Moreover, the likelihood
of a self-fulfilling speculative attack may be
increased by the mere possibility that controls
are introduced in the future (Dooley 1996: 669).
Overall, for the case of Chile, Laurens and
Cardoso (1998: 16) rejected that the URR has
helped the authorities to obtain breathing-space
and to adjust domestic policies. Rather, the
authors argued that the controls have tended to
delay integration of the Chilean economy into
global markets, have failed to reduce domestic
interest rates, and have increased the degree
of regulation in the Chilean economy. For
Slovenia, the maintenance of the URR would be
an obstacle to future EU and OECD member-
ship and has consequently been critized by the
Capital Controls and Financial
Market Volatility
3.2
The central intuition behind the proposal to
introduce Chilean-type capital controls is the
notion that financial markets react faster than
goods markets, and that the interaction of
traders on financial markets gives rise to herd-
ing behavior and noise trading. This, in turn,
drives a wedge between the price of a financial
^ The literature on speculative attacks, which dates
back to the seminal paper by Krugman (1979), is
surveyed comprehensively by Agenor et al. (1992).
For a general discussion of capital account con-
vertibility and OECD -membership, see Quirk and
Evans (1995). The opinion of the EU on Slovenia can
be found in EU (1998).11




























































































instrument and its fundamental value, and thus
causes excessive volatility in the price of finan-
cial variables. The fast and sudden changes in
financial markets are in contrast to the delayed
responses of the real sector. This might be sub-
optimal because physical investment and ex-
ports might be reduced and because resources
might be misallocated. As a result, overall
growth and welfare might suffer.
Using the standard sticky price model devel-
oped by Dornbusch (1976), it can in fact be
shown that the imposition of a transaction tax
reduces the degree of overshooting of exchange
rates (Buch et al. 1998). Hence, domestic inter-
est rate shocks have less of an impact on ex-
change rate volatility. The model shows at the
same time, however, that there is no free lunch.
Policymakers should take into account that the
implementation of a transaction tax by itself is
an exogenous shock which pushes the economy
to a new steady state equilibrium. This is be-
cause, in essence, the imposition of a trans-
action tax has the same effect as a domestic
interest rate shock. Hence, both the introduction
and the subsequent elimination of transaction
taxes cause an (overshooting) exchange rate ad-
justment. This must be considered when pro-
posing the "temporary" introduction of capital
controls in the event of an acute financial crisis.
An additional case against temporary capital
controls has been made by Reinhart and Smith
(1997) who argued that, in order to be effective,
temporary controls on capital inflows would
have to be very punitive.
1
2 Resulting welfare
gains might thus be lost easily if the controls
are not removed early enough.
One aim of Chilean-type taxes on capital
flows is to change the structure of capital flows
away from short-term (presumably more vola-
tile) towards long-term (less volatile) capital
flows, and in particular towards foreign direct
investments. More specifically, as URRs in-
crease the costs of short-term financial credits,
one would suspect that they tilt the structure of
foreign credits towards longer maturities.
Table 2 shows the shares of short-term bank
credits in total bank credits received from
abroad for selected countries. At the end of
1998, the share of short-term bank credits was
in a similar range of about 52-53 percent in
Asia and Latin America, and only 36 percent
for the transition economies of Central and
Eastern Europe. At least through 1996, devel-
opments in Chile tracked developments in Latin
America as a whole quite closely. Since 1996,
the share of short-term lending to Chile has
been below-average and on a decline, reaching
similar proportions as in the early 1990s. In
contrast to the initial introduction of the URR in
1991, which seemed to have had relatively little
This argument is based on the observation that the
intertemporal rate of substitution of consumption is
low in developing countries. Hence, the current ac-
count effect of a small tax would be limited.12
effect on the maturity structure of foreign bank
lending, this might be attributable to the in-
crease in the effective tax rate in 1996 (see
Figure 2).
Looking at the composition of total capital
flows, Laurens and Cardoso (1998: 14) reported
mixed evidence on the effects of the URR.
While some studies found a decline in the share
of short-term inflows, others found the reverse
or simply no effect. Mainly, these differences
are due to different time frames and different
definitions of capital flows being used.
Generally, an important caveat that needs to be
borne in mind is that net errors and omissions in
the balance of payments have increased in
Chile, and that statistics are suspected to have
become less reliable after the introduction of
the URR.
Evidence for Slovenia points much more
clearly towards a change in the composition of
bank lending towards longer maturities. Here,
the share of short-term bank credits has been
below the average for the region and has shown
a clear downward trend throughout the period
under study (1994—1998). Yet, as was already
argued above, an impact of the URR on the
overall structure of total capital flows, i.e., a
decline of financial credits relative to FDI or
portfolio capital, could not be found (Buch and
Hanschel 1999).
The results from the BIS data are confirmed
by information on the structure of total foreign
debt (Figure 4). In Chile, the share of short-
term debt in total foreign debt has increased, if
anything, between 1991 and 1994. More recent-
ly, the share of short-term debt has declined.
Overall, the maturity structure of foreign debt
has tended to follow a similar pattern for the
four Latin American countries under review.
For Slovenia, the share of total short-term
debt has declined between 1993 and 1996 from
6.5 to 1.4 percent, hereby following a similar
trend as the debt structure of Poland (World
Bank 1999). In the Czech Republic and Estonia,
short-term debt reached values of almost 30
percent in 1996, showing an upward trend over
time.
A priori though, data on the maturity structure
of foreign debt provides little evidence on the
volatility of capital flows. From an empirical
point of view, one of the main problems in re-
ducing the volatility of capital flows by means
of a "tax" on selective flows is that standard
classifications provide only limited evidence on
the actual volatility of different capital account
items (Claessens et al. 1995). Short-term capital
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"Volatility measures by the coefficient of variation = ratio of standard deviation to mean. —
 bIncluding long-term portfolio
capital. —
 cBased on aggregate net flows to and from region.
Source: Lipsey (1999: Table 5).
flows are not necessarily the most volatile item
in the capital account of the balance of pay-
ments, and the volatility of different capital
flows varies from country to country.
This finding has been largely confirmed by
recent evidence presented by Lipsey (1999, see
also Table 3). His data support the view that
foreign direct investment is stable relative to
portfolio capital or financial credits. However,
short-term capital is not necessarily the most
volatile item in the capital account. In the
transition economies of Central and Eastern
Europe, for instance, the timing of the privati-
zation process has often caused substantial
volatility in foreign direct investment flows
(Buch et al. 1998), i.e., in a capital account item
which is typically considered relatively stable.
In addition, it remains an open issue to what


















Whitney f/-tests on ec
at the 10, 5, 1 percent
Mean of quarterly capital flows
(millions of US dollars)
before after probability''
Standard deviation of quarterly capital flows
(millions of US dollars)
before after probability
Slovenia
29.6 47.9 0.07* 16.9 28.8 0.07*
29.3 51.1 0.03** 16.6 29.6 0.05*
0.3 -3.4 0.01** 3.5 3.2 0.78
-23.4 60.7 0.23 91.2 220.2 0.00***
41.5 91.2 0.29 78.4 140.6 0.05*
-63.8 -30.4 0.55 101.9 169.5 0.08*




Standard deviation of exchange rate to the US dollar'^
before after probability
Slovenia
0.34 0.23 0.20 0.62 0.29 0.09*
0.28 0.27 0.38 0.59 0.39 0.08*
Chile
0.16 0.11 0.02** 0.21 0.19 0.12
0.14 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.19 0.16
capital controls = 1992:1-1994:4 for Slovenia (capital flows), 1992:1-1995:1 for Slovenia (exchange rates),
hile. After imposition of capital controls = 1995:1-1998:3 for Slovenia (capital flows), 1995:2-1997:12 for
tes), 1991:1-1998:12 for Chile.— bResuits of t- and F-tests, respectively, on equality in means and variance
vledian of absolute changes in exchange rates over previous month at an annual rate (monthly data). —
f change in exchange rates over previous month at an annual rate (monthly data). —
 eResults of Mann-
uality in the median. — ^Results of Siegel-Tukey test on equality in the variance. — *,**,*** = significant
evel, respectively.
Source: IMF (1999b); own calculations.14




Evidence from Chile and Slovenia does not
show a decline in the volatility of capital flows
after the controls had been imposed. As for
Chile, there was a relatively strong increase in
the standard deviation of capital inflows subject
to controls after the controls had been intro-
duced. In the four years prior to the intro-
duction of the URR, the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation/mean) was 1.52, and it in-
creased to 4.22 in the four subsequent years.
1
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At the same time, there is support for a reduc-
tion in exchange rate volatility pursuant to the
introduction of the URR. Yet, as Laurens and
Cardoso noted (1998: 14), the effects of capital
controls and of foreign exchange market inter-
vention of the monetary authorities can hardly
be isolated.
The results for Slovenia look similar: While
the URR has not shielded the economy from an
increase in financial market volatility as evi-
denced by increased volatility of capital flows,
real and nominal exchange rates tended to be
less volatile in the period following the intro-
duction of the URR (Table 4). Mainly, this is
the result of the exchange rate policy that the
Slovene authorities have pursued: By defending
an implicit exchange rate target vis-a-vis the D-
mark, exchange market interventions have ap-
parently been used to prevent an increased vola-
tility of capital flows to transmit into increased
exchange rate volatility.
3.3 Capital Controls and the Sequence
of Financial Liberalization
Increased volatility in financial markets is a
concern because inter alia it threatens the stabil-
1
3 Dopke and Pierdzioch (1999) reviewed the relevant
empirical literature and found no evidence for a link
between financial market volatility and the real sector
in Germany.
1
4 These data were calculated from Laban et al. (1997:
Table 1). In the International Financial Statistics of
the IMF (IMF 1999b), on which the calculations of
Table 4 are based, quarterly data for the Chilean
balance of payments were available only from 1991
onwards.
ity of banking systems. Recent episodes of
banking and balance of payments crises, so-
called "twin crises"
15, have thus shifted interest
away from capital controls as a means of af-
fording domestic policy with a greater degree of
autonomy towards capital controls as a means
of preventing banking crises. Hence, the debate
on the optimal sequencing of external and inter-
nal financial liberalization has been revived
(Eichengreen et al. 1999).
If distortions in the domestic banking system
cannot be eliminated at short notice, McKinnon
and Pill (1995) proposed to restrict short-term
capital flows and to limit consumer borrowing
and mortgage finance while liberalizing FDI
flows as a second-best strategy. They argued
that in the presence of an implicit deposit insur-
ance system and of insufficient banking super-
vision, external financial liberalization exposes
commercial banks to a variety of risks, includ-
ing foreign exchange risks. Because of asym-
metries in information about domestic funda-
mentals, market participants rely on the infor-
mation that is provided by domestic banks. Yet,
banks which operate in a distorted environment
fail to take the downside risks of their activities
into account and might thus signal overly opti-
mistic beliefs about the domestic economy. If
investor sentiment changes, foreign capital is
suddenly withdrawn.
The optimal sequencing of internal and ex-
ternal financial liberalization has been an issue
not only since the recent financial crisis. It has
rather been discussed in the context of reforms
in developing countries before. Blejer and
Sagari (1987), for instance, argued that external
financial liberalization should follow internal
liberalization in order to shield temporarily
domestic banks from competition from abroad.
Focusing on the role of banks in reducing in-
formation asymmetries in financial markets,
Aizenman (1998) showed that external financial
liberalization by lowering deposit interest rates
might increase banks' willingness to take risks
and thus reduce their incentives to monitor
firms. Hence, overall welfare might decline.
See Buch and Heinrich (1999) for an overview and a
theoretical discussion.15
This would hold in particular if distortions such
as an automatic deposit insurance system made
banks prone to take risks, and if domestic
banking supervision was weak. Consequently, it
might be argued that by using a reserve require-
ment to drive a wedge between domestic and
foreign interest rates, the resulting welfare loss
might be reduced.
However, the case for a sequencing of do-
mestic and external financial liberalization be-
comes less evident if two additional factors are
taken into account. First, the ability to cover in-
sufficient supervision of the domestic banking
system and other distortions by means of capital
controls must be questioned. As Valdes-Prieto
and Soto (1998) argued, countries which lack
the means to monitor the domestic banking sys-
tem efficiently typically also lack the means to
administer a system of capital controls effi-
ciently. Evidence surveyed by Dooley (1996:
675) supports this argument, as in industrialized
countries (with more efficient supervisory sys-
tems) capital controls tend to have a greater
impact on the volume and the composition of
capital flows than in developing countries (with
less efficient supervisory systems). This led
Laurens and Cardoso (1998: 21) to conclude
that "such [Chilean-type] measures should not
be recommended in countries whose institu-
tions, in particular the central bank, do not have
the expertise and resources to enforce them."
Yet, these are precisely those countries for
which the imposition of controls seems particu-
larly warranted.
Second, opening up for foreign capital and
granting market access to foreign banks can
help to improve the efficiency of domestic fi-
nancial intermediation. All too often, countries
with financial systems that had been shielded
from foreign competition previously found that
they had little alternative to opening up for for-
eign banks after financial crises had hit. In
those Asian economies which fell victim to fi-
nancial market turbulences, market access of
foreign banks has been liberalized recently. In
the case of Russia, the central bank has stated
its intention to drop existing entry restrictions
for foreign banks, and foreign capital is hoped
to play a role in the recapitalization of Russia's
banking system.
In summary, these considerations show that
the case for internal-before-external financial
liberalization is less evident than the conven-
tional wisdom might suggest. This holds in par-
ticular if limited external financial liberalization
includes limited market access of foreign banks.
In fact, those countries that have opened up for
foreign competition in the financial services
sector decisively have typically fared better
than those that have taken a more cautious ap-
proach. Rather than trying to fine-tune liberal-
ization steps, it seems that progressing simul-
taneously on internal and external financial
liberalization is the preferable option. At the
time of opening up for foreign capital, mini-
mum prudential standards should be in place
which might be established with the help of for-
eign technical assistance. At the same time, dis-
tortions such as automatic deposit insurance
systems should be abolished as these may send
false signals to foreign and domestic investors.
Again, evidence from Eastern Europe can
serve as a useful reference.
1
6 In Estonia, for in-
stance, most restrictions on the free flow of for-
eign capital were relaxed at the beginning of the
reforms in 1992/93, and capital flows (includ-
ing the market access of foreign banks) were
fully liberalized in 1994. At the same time, the
Estonian authorities have made clear that they
would not bail out insolvent banks uncondi-
tionally and have closed down a fair number of
banks in early 1993. Although the Estonian
economy has been showing signs of overheat-
ing and has been running large current account
deficits recently, it is not evident that the capital
account regime has contributed negatively to
these developments. Hungary presents another
interesting case as the country has opened up its
banking sector more rapidly for competition
from abroad than the Czech Republic or Poland
(The Banker 1999). If anything, this has en-
hanced the efficiency of the Hungarian banking
system without jeopardizing the survival of the
incumbent banks.
*" For a more detailed analysis of the advanced tran-
sition economies and for an overview of the relevant
literature see Buch et al. (1999a).16
3.4 Capital Controls and Uncertainty
When discussing the welfare implications of
capital controls, not only direct effects on the
volatility of financial markets and on monetary
autonomy but also more indirect effects on in-
vestment should be taken into account. General-
ly, empirical support has been found for the
hypothesis that growth and investment, on the
one hand, and the development of the financial
sector, on the other hand, are positively re-
lated.
1
7 Williamson and Mahar (1998) reported
evidence which looked directly at the impli-
cations of capital account liberalization for the
access of firms to external credits and the effi-
ciency of investment. On balance, the available
evidence points to a positive link between liber-
alization and investment efficiency.
In contrast to earlier work on the links
between external financial liberalization and
growth, which were based on standard invest-
ment functions, recent theoretical contributions
have employed models which feature invest-
ment under uncertainty.
1
8 Uncertainty about the
course of domestic policies, and irreversibility
of investment increase the willingness of in-
vestors to postpone their projects (Dixit and
Pindyck 1994). This has implications for the
volume and structure of capital inflows as well
as for the sequencing of capital account liberal-
ization. In the presence of uncertainty and ir-
reversibility of investment, capital inflows will
be biased towards relatively liquid, short-term
investments (Buch et al. 1999b). Hence, mea-
sures that increase uncertainty and irreversibil-
ity (such as the imposition of capital controls)
might have the unintended effect of tilting the
structure capital flows towards short-term funds.
Bartolini and Drazen (1997) have used a
framework of investment under uncertainty to
show that, if foreign investors are incompletely
informed about the actual intentions of a gov-
ernment, the introduction of capital controls can
have negative effects on total investment as it
sends negative signals about future policies. In
their model, information about the type of a
government is distributed asymmetrically be-
tween investors and governments. Governments
can raise revenue by taxing the capital stock in
their country, and they differ with respect to the
alternative sources of income to which they
have access. The imposition of capital controls
sends a negative signal to investors that govern-
ments lack alternative sources of income and
are thus likely to impose controls in the future.
Conversely, abolishing controls on capital out-




Using a similar framework, Laban and
Larrain (1997) have taken issue with the com-
mon practice to be more liberal with the liber-
alization of capital inflows rather than out-
flows.
20 They show that a relaxation of controls
on capital outflows, aimed at reducing the scope
for a real appreciation of the domestic currency,
may actually increase net capital inflows rather
than lowering them. In the presence of capital
controls, the option to defer the investment
decision has a positive value to investors. This
option value of waiting is positive if uncertainty
about the future prevails, if the current invest-
ment opportunity is available also in future
periods, and if capital controls make investment
irreversible. Conversely, policy measures that
reduce the option value and thus increase in-
vestment are those which either reduce the ir-
reversibility of investment (for example, by
lowering controls on capital outflows) or that
reduce uncertainty about future investment con-
ditions.
1
7 See Levine (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) for
surveys of the relevant literature.
1
8 See Fry (1995) for a survey of the traditional liter-
ature.
1
9 This argument, however, does not apply necessarily if
economic agents believe that an abolition of capital
controls will be reversed in the future. Van
Wijnbergen (1985) showed that if in the aftermath of
trade liberalization uncertainty regarding a future
reversal of economic policy remains, investors may
postpone investments.
2
0 See Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) for the empirical
evidence.17
4. What Are the Alternatives?
The analysis so far has suggested that policy-
makers better expect little help from the impo-
sition of URRs when trying to shield their econ-
omies from the adverse effects of fast-moving
(short-term) capital flows. The imposition of
capital controls, if orchestrated faultily, may
even have the unintended effect of sending
negative signals to both foreign and domestic
investors about future policies and therefore
may affect investment negatively. In short,
capital controls cannot substitute for sound
domestic policies, in particular in the banking
sector. At the same time, structural policies
cannot be adjusted quickly. Hence, implement-
ing sound policies must be a long-term strategy
and cannot be resorted to in the acute case of a
financial crisis. In addition, negative spillover
and contagion effects might affect also those
countries which have already implemented
sound policies. Hence, safeguard measures to
shield otherwise sound countries from the ad-
verse effects of international financial crises
might have to be devised.
This section briefly discusses alternatives
that are available to policymakers both at a na-
tional and at an international level to mitigate
potentially negative effects of international
capital flows. We start with a discussion of the
links between domestic policies and contagion
effects, using the response of the transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe to the
recent economic and financial crisis of Russia
as an example. In addition, recent proposals to
reform the international financial system are re-
viewed.
4.1 Domestic Policies and Contagion:
The Case of Eastern Europe
Although the literature tends to find little evi-
dence for the effectiveness of Tobin-type capi-
tal controls on volatility or the volume of capi-
tal flows, the controls might nevertheless have
had an effect in shielding countries such as
Chile or Slovenia from adverse effects of acute
financial crises elsewhere. Ultimately, the im-
portance of spillover effects is an empirical
issue. Edwards (1998a) assessed the contagion
effects of the Mexican financial crisis of 1995
on Argentina and Chile. He found that nominal
interest rates were more volatile in Argentina
than in Chile in response to the crisis and that
interest rate differentials in Chile adjusted less
quickly after the imposition of capital controls.
At the same time, it is difficult to argue
that Chile was infected by the spillovers from
Mexico to a lesser extent than, for instance,
Argentina because o/the controls, as other rele-
vant policies might have differed as well.
This section discusses briefly the experience
of the transition economies of Central and
Eastern Europe with the Russian financial
crisis. In contrast to Slovenia, these economies
have opened up their capital accounts relatively
quickly for foreign capital. This raises the issue
of whether, by liberalizing their capital ac-
counts, countries such as the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland have unduly exposed
themselves to contagion from Russia. If con-
tagion can sweep away countries whose major
fault was to prematurely open their capital ac-
counts and subject themselves to the whims of
international financial markets, then the Russian
crisis should be the litmus test.
In August 1998, the Russian ruble suc-
cumbed to a successful speculative attack which
turned Russia into a severe economic and finan-
cial crisis. By the end of March 1999, the value
of the ruble had plummeted to less than 75 per-
cent of its pre-crisis value. Recent develop-
ments in Russia have undeniably taken their toll
on these countries (Figures 5 and 6). Stock mar-
kets have fallen, currencies have at least tempo-
rarily been under pressure, and foreign financ-
ing has become more difficult to obtain. The
question is whether these contagion effects
would go beyond the direct effects, working
through, for instance, trade links, and would
thus lower longer-run growth prospects.
The first important observation is that the de-
cline in stock prices and the increase in risk pre-
mia on bonds after the Russian crisis parallels
developments on Western markets. The German
stock index, for example, likewise declined, and18
Figure 5: Stock Market Indices, 1997-1999
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spreads on corporate bonds issued by medium-
sized borrowers from industrialized countries
have increased in the wake of the crisis. Hence,
it is difficult to argue that the Russian crisis has
had particular spillover effects on the countries
under study over and above the general trends
in international equity and bond markets in the
second half of 1998. Rather, contagion effects
of the Russian financial crisis in the stock mar-
ket seem to have been a European phenomenon
whereas the effects of the Asian crises have had
a decidedly more global dimension (Linne
1998).
Moreover, the temporary pressure on the cur-
rencies has not unduly constrained domestic
economic policies. There have not been any
forced devaluations, central banks have not lost
reserves over a longer period, nor were they
forced to raise interest rates significantly. At the
end of 1998, Poland and the Czech Republic
even lowered key interest rates. Finally, pos-
sible adverse effects on the ability of these
countries to access the international capital mar-
ket seem to have been short-lived (Papi 1998).
In the third quarter of 1998, claims of foreign
banks on Russia plummeted (Table 5), and the
contraction continued through the fourth quar-
ter. In the same period, claims on other tran-
sition economies, notably the Czech Republic
and Poland, increased while claims on Hungary
decreased only slightly. Likewise, claims on
Slovenia declined in the fourth quarter of the
year. This may have been one of the reasons
why the Bank of Slovenia eventually set the re-
serve requirement for foreign financial credits
to zero in early 1999.
A number of explanations for this outcome
can be found. One is that direct trade links with
Russia are relatively small. The immediate im-
pact of reduced demand from Russia on these
countries' real economies has therefore been
limited. This may have helped steady the nerves
of international investors who were wondering
whether it was time, after pulling out of Russia,
to pull out of the Czech Republic, Hungary, or
Poland. Hence, the substantial trade re-orienta-
tion and diversification that has taken place
during transformation has made the countries
less vulnerable to negative shocks spilling
over from Russia. As regards financial linkages,
macroeconomic implications also seem relative-
ly minor as exposure to countries in the former
Soviet Union is confined to individual banks
from the region (Turtelboom 1998). Moreover,
the prospect of EU membership may have pro-
vided added stability to the advanced reform
states, essentially because the EU has con-
ditioned entry talks on progress in reforms.
The key factor that emerges from the ex-
perience of the accession states is that, in con-
trast to Russia, the countries have backed up
their integration into international capital mar-
kets by deep-reaching reforms in other relevant
areas. International capital markets have so far
rewarded their reform efforts by clearly dis-
criminating between these countries and
Russia.
2
1 Overall, the impact of the Russian
crisis on those countries has been limited thus
far, and average growth and inflation forecasts
21 A similar conclusion was reached in the most recent
transition report of the EBRD (1998). See also Fries
etal. (1998).20
for 1999 are only somewhat less favorable than
those for 1998 (EBRD 1998).
Evidence from Asia likewise suggests that
structural reforms at the domestic level can
reduce the exposure of emerging market econ-
omies to volatile capital flows. In Asia, a major
factor behind changes in the composition of
capital inflows away from long-term FDI to-
wards short-term flows have been sterilization
policies which held domestic interest rates at
high levels (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998).
Moreover, exchange rate policies must be suf-
ficiently flexible to adjust to external shocks.
Perhaps the most important policy implica-
tion apart from the need for sound structural
reforms is the crucial need to disseminate trans-
parent, timely, and reliable information to the
international investment community. Better in-
formation policies would substantially reduce
the costs of obtaining information for market
participants and thus stimulate long-term in-
vestment. Although this would not eliminate
financial market volatility, improved availabil-
ity of information is likely to increase the
stability of capital flows and the importance of
market fundamentals for international invest-
ment decisions.
4.2. Reforming the International
Financial Architecture
Apart from adjustments of domestic policies,
institutional changes in the international finan-
cial architecture can potentially help to re-
duce the probability that basically innocent
bystanders are hit by financial crises in
other countries. As the relevant contributions to
the on-going debate have been discussed
and comprehensively summarized elsewhere
(Eichengreen 1999), only two proposals will be
sketched here. The first relates to an adjustment
in the lending policies of the IMF by providing
Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs) to its member
countries. The second proposal is representative
for a class of suggestions which intends to rely
more heavily on market mechanisms to alter the
structure of foreign debt. More specifically, we
will discuss briefly the Universal Debt Rollover
Option with a Penalty (UDROP) which has
been suggested by Buiter and Sibert (1999).
Essentially, all proposals for reforming the
international financial architecture are based on
the notion that asymmetries in information and
uncertainty prevent financial markets from tell-
ing insolvent and merely illiquid borrowers (or
countries, for that matter) apart. Under perfect
information, markets would be able to distin-
guish illiquid from insolvent borrowers. They
would extend additional finance to the former,
but would deny fresh finance to the latter.
2
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Under imperfect information, such a separating
equilibrium is not reached necessarily. Rather,
borrowers are likely to be pooled together, and
finance might be denied to all applicants.
Should a financial crisis strike somewhere, mar-
kets would reassess the probability that other
countries might be affected. In this situation,
the inability of a borrower to service its external
debt would be taken as a negative signal about
solvency.
Recently, the IMF has decided to provide a
Contingent Credit Line to its member coun-
tries.
2
3 The CCL aims at assisting those coun-
tries which are fundamentally sound but which
are exposed to the risk of contagion effects
from financial crises elsewhere. Hence, it pre-
cisely aims at granting liquidity to illiquid
countries which might otherwise be pooled
together with insolvent countries. Obviously, in
order to mitigate significantly moral hazard in
financial markets, at least three issues need to
be resolved. First, the decision which countries
qualify for assistance under such program has
to be made ex ante, i.e., prior to the emergence
of a crisis. Essentially, access to the CCL would
thus be on a case-by-case basis. As quick action
is typically required when a financial crisis hits,
this requires relatively efficient decision mecha-
nisms. Second, the discretionary nature of the
process potentially opens the field for political
lobbying and for a renegotiation of initial terms.
2
2 Note that in a national context, refinancing for il-
liquid borrowers (banks) is provided via the lender-
of-last-resort facility of the central bank. However,
such facility does not exist in an international context,
i.e., for foreign-currency-denominated debt (Buiter
and Sibert 1999).
2
3 This paragraph draws on Golder (1999).21
Third, defining clear access criteria will be dif-
ficult, and the actual refinancing needs are still
an open issue.
In parallel to this new lending facility, mar-
ket-based schemes which are based on an ad-
justment of international bond terms are thus
under discussion. One of these proposals has
been advanced by Buiter and Sibert (1999).
They have suggested to attach a mandatory roll-
over option (UDROP) to any cross-border fin-
ancial contract. Should a borrower have insuf-
ficient funds to cover its foreign liabilities, it
would be granted the option to roll over its ex-
ternal debt at a penalty rate. This would give
merely illiquid borrowers the opportunity to
raise additional finance. As borrowers would
decide unilaterally whether to exercise this op-
tion, there would be no need to assess the bor-
rower status externally. Hence, the asymmetric
information problem would be mitigated. The
option would be priced on the market, i.e., the
costs of foreign borrowing would rise.
The authors discussed several objections to
their proposal. Most importantly, adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard problems would arise
because both illiquid and insolvent borrowers
could make use of the option. Therefore, Buiter
and Sibert proposed to grant the right to roll
over a loan only once, i.e., a potential insolven-
cy would eventually come to the surface after
an additional period has elapsed. Also, UDROP
should be mandatory for all financial contracts
in order to prevent bad risks to mimic
good risks (which would not make use of
the option were it voluntary). Obviously, even
with these modifications, UDROP would not
solve the problems on international financial
markets entirely. Under asymmetric informa-
tion, the fair pricing of the roll-over option
would remain an open issue. Also, effective
supervising whether all contracts actually have
the option attached to them would need to be
ensured. Yet, the proposal shows that it is
feasible to invent new contract designs which
might be superior to non-market based solu-
tions.
5. Concluding Remarks
The main result of this paper is that (Chilean-
type) capital controls are no panacea. This, by
itself, should not be very surprising as there is
no economic policy measure which, seen in
isolation, has beneficial effects always and
everywhere. In fact, proponents of capital con-
trols and in particular of taxes and reserve re-
quirements on short-term capital flows would
argue that these instruments should be part of a
consistent overall reform program. Without
safeguards against volatile capital flows, other-
wise sound economic policies may be derailed,
and financial crises elsewhere may hit innocent
bystanders.
Essentially, the case for Chilean- or Tobin-
type capital controls is based on the notion that
financial markets react faster than goods mar-
kets. This market imperfection may cause fluc-
tuations in the real economy which are not
linked to fundamentals and, hence, a corrective
tax may enhance welfare. This argument has
hardly been challenged by the present paper.
Yet, the introduction of restrictions on short-
term capital flows will be welfare-enhancing
only under a set of special conditions. These, in
turn, are hardly found in reality.
On a rather practical level, the actual design
and enforcement of the tax is an open issue. If
current and capital account transactions have
been liberalized in general, various mechanisms
to evade the tax can be devised. While these do
not erode completely the effectiveness of the
tax, they still reduce its impact. Moreover, as
additional (scarce) resources must be freed to
supervise the enforcement of the scheme, other
policy areas might suffer.
In addition, Chilean-type capital controls and
other taxes on cross-border financial flows have
the potential of reducing the overshooting of
exchange rates. Yet, the imposition of these
taxes by itself can lead to an overshooting pro-
cess because it is conceptually identical with a
negative shock to the domestic interest rate.
This mechanism cautions particularly against
the imposition of temporary controls.22
Even though Chile's and Slovenia's URRs
might have lowered inflows of short-term finan-
cial credits, this has not necessarily reduced the
volatility of capital flows. One reason for this
finding is that there is no clear evidence as to
which type of capital flows is the most volatile
and how volatility changes after the imposition
of controls. In contrast to the conventional wis-
dom, short-term capital flows are not necessar-
ily the most volatile capital account item. Ex-
change rate volatility, in contrast, has tended to
come down in the period following the im-
position of URRs. Yet, the extent to which this
decline is a result of exchange market inter-
vention of the monetary authorities rather than
the capital control regime, remains an open
issue.
The ability of URRs to provide both the
monetary authorities with greater autonomy and
leeway to implement structural reforms must be
questioned. In Chile and Slovenia, the controls
have not halted an increased inflow of foreign
capital. Generally, URRs cannot prevent specu-
lative attacks on misaligned currencies but may
at best delay the timing of a speculative attack.
Proponents of a tax would argue that it is pre-
cisely this additional breathing time that gov-
ernments gain which makes the tax attractive.
Yet, this window of opportunity may fail to
deliver what it promises if domestic authorities
are not willing or able to act quickly and to
tackle structural problems.
It is often argued that capital controls could
be used to shield banking systems that are poor-
ly supervised from adverse effects of external
financial liberalization. Yet, the administrative
capacity to enforce such regulations is typically
poor precisely in those countries for which the
controls would seem most desirable. This paper
has argued that internal and external financial
liberalization could proceed in parallel if the
authorities are willing to implement basic bank-
ing standards (possibly with the help of foreign
technical assistance), to withdraw implicit de-
posit insurance schemes, and to open up for
foreign banks.
Alternatives to taxes on cross-border capital
flows suited to reduce exposure to volatile capi-
tal flows and to contain contagion in financial
markets have been discussed. Evidence from
Eastern Europe has shown that countries with
relatively open capital accounts and, in prin-
ciple, sound policies could handle contagion
effects from the Russian financial crisis rela-
tively well. This suggests that domestic policy
has room to maneuver even in globalized finan-
cial markets. Sufficiently flexible exchange rate
policies and reforms of the banking sector have
helped the successful transition economies to
stave off adverse external shocks. Hence, by
pursuing structural reforms, by disseminating
clear and transparent information, and by using
market mechanisms to alter the structure of for-
eign debt, governments can significantly reduce
exposure to external shocks and can most ef-
ficiently use scarce administrative resources.
Hereby, international institutions have an im-
portant role to play in designing and enforcing
an institutional framework in which such mech-
anisms can be implemented.23
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